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Existentially-mute theories and existence under assumptions. 
0.1 Synopsis. The notion of ~-mute theories is a generalization of Kleene's 
[62] stroke relation, i.e. - the single - axiom theory {C} (where C is a 
closed fla) is j-mute exactly when clc. We show that the property 
T l--3xAx ~ in T l-Au 
(provability in int. arith.; -3xAx closed, n a numeral) holds exactly when 
Tis -3-mute. 
As a simple application of the method of proof we obtain the result 
(already proved by Smorynski [71]) that classical arithmetic is not an ex-
tension of bounded complexity of intuitionistic arithmetic. 
Next we relate the notion of ~-mute theories to Kleene's stroke rela-
tion, and we exhibit some simple structural properties of -3-mute theories. 
Finally we deal with theories which may replace intuitionistic arith-
metic in the treatment above. We call these "-3-stable theories". We show 
that 
rule 
any extension of 
{A.}. 
1 1 . _] . B is -::i-valid 
int. arith. with an "3-valid" rule is ~-stable, where a 
if for every ~-mute theory T 
{T f- A.}. ~ T ~ B • 
1 1 
Among the j-valid rules we find the uniform reflection principle, but not 
Markov scheme. 
Our main results are only a slight generalization of theorems of 
Scarpellini [72]. New are only the presentation in a system of natural de-
duction, and some peripherial material. 
0.2. Preliminary conventions and notations. We use throughout Gentzen's 
natural deduction system for intuitionistic arithmetic, and the notions and 
results of the metatheory developped by Prawitz ([65],[70]) for it. 
We restrict our attention to the disjunction-free part of intuitionis-
tic arithmetic, since the j-guantifier is intuitionistically definable in 
this fragment (for details vid. Leivant [73]). But we still write Av Bas 
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a shorthand for 
~x{[x = 0 + A] & [x = 1 + BJ} . 
We use a, a0 , S etc. as meta-parameters for sets of flas. 
¢, w etc. are meta-parameters for functionals, i.e. - functions whose 
domain and range will be defined every time explicitly. We say that¢ is 
p.r. when the arithmetical function 
is p.r. , 
rx1 being the Godel-number of the object x. 
s:is the set of strictly-positive subformulas of the formula A, and 
s:++ = 
a 
-If n is a natural number, then n denotes the numeral n, i.e. -
5 = 0 ' n+1 = n 
fl, B etc. denote occurrences of the flas A, B .... 
IA denotes intuitionistic (Heyting's) arithmetic, 
CA - classical (Peano's) arithmetic. 
1. Existentially-mute theories. 
1.1. Definitions. 
Let a be a set of closed (and disjunction free) flas of (first-order) 
arithmetic, and let¢ be a functioned from derivations to natural numbers. 
We define a set of flas s¢ c s*as follows: 
(i A€ o.-. A€ s¢ 
(ij A & B € 
(iij) A+ B € 
Ct. 
s¢ ..__.AB€ s¢ ~ , a 
q> ¢ So. ===> B € So. 
a - a 
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( iv) Vx.Ax E: s¢1 
(v ) 1x.Ax E: Si 
a 
====- An E: S¢, for every natural number n. 
a 
and TI is a derivation for u I- :lxA.x, then A(cj>Il) E: s<P. 
Cl 
( vi ) Only flas which can be sho"Wn to be ins¢ by clauses (i)-(v) a.re 
0. 
Let~ be a functional from derivations to derivations. We say that~ 
is a confirmation functioned of lli, if whenever 
and IT is a derivation for o. 1- :lxA.x, 
then ~TI is a derivation for a r A(cj>IT). ¢, is a choice-functional for a if 
there is a confirmation functional of ¢/a. 
If there is a choice functj ona.1 for a we say that a is 3-mute, and if 
not - that a is essentially-existential. 
1.2. Theorem: Let a be 3-mute, 3x.Ax closed. 
0. I- :JxA,x ~ -Jln Cl t- An • 
More precisely: Let¢, be a choice-functional for a, and$ a confirma-
tion functionaJ. for ¢,. If TI is a derivation for a f- :lxAx then we can find, 
primitive-recursively in¢,, a number n, and primitive-recursively in• - a 
derivation TI* for a I- An. 
The proof occupies the rest of this section. 
1.2.1 Let us say that an occurrence :lxF in a derivation Il is a-critical if 
(i) :lxF is a closed fla. 
{ij} :lxF is the major premise of an instance of 3E. 
(iij) :lxF depends in IT only on flas in o.. 
1.2.2. Lemma: Let a,¢,,$ be as in the theorem. Every derivation IT for a r A 
is transformable (by instructions that are p.r. in$) to a derivation Il 0 
of the form 
l-1 
0 
n _ {Fi} 1 < n 
IT 1 
for a r A 
-4-
s.t. (i)rr 1 1s normal and without redundant parameters (n.w.r.p. for 
short); 
( ij ) there is no a-critical occurrence 1n IT 1 ; 
E s! } i < n . 
E range ljJ 
(iij) F. 
l 
( iv) 2" 
1 
Proof of the lemma: by induction on the complexity of derivations, i.e. -
by cases of inference-rules. The only non-trivial case is an instance of 
3E where the maJor premise is a-critical, i.e. -
IL r. 
l J 
a. {G.} CJ. {H.} [Aa] 
l J 
t. 1 r 1 (a) 
I - -:rxAx B 3E 
B 
with conditions (i)-(iv) on the main subderivations, by ind. ass .• 
The part 
a {G.} 
l 
t. 1 
jxAx 
of L 
1 being normal, every main branch o oft. has only an elimination-part. 3xAx 
is critical, therefore closed, so 3xAx is a strictly-positive subformula of 
the top-formula C of o, which belongs to au {G.} cs¢. 
l - a 
Furthermore, no existential fla other than 3xAx may occur in 0, because 
such an occurrence would necessarily be closed, and would be the major 
premise of an instance of jE, and hence a.-critical, contradicting the ind. 
ass .• So 3xAx is not a s.p. subformula of any s.p. existential subformula of 
C, and therefore jxAx ES¢ (disregarding the definition of¢). 
C( 
Define now 
I1 - Df 
r. 
J 
a {H.} 
J 
lj;i;, 
[A(¢ll)] 
r1(¢t.) 
B 
whi t,V l pos~;ess ired 
.. .:. . .. 3 Proof of the theore1n. 
the , and let 
0 
n ;;_ 
-3xAx 
be obtained from TT by the lemma. 
Case 1: The last inference of n° ~s an At , 3xAx say. Since is 
n.w.r.p. t must be free of parameters, and therefore it represents a numer-
al. Take 
I-
* l 
Il _{F.}a 
l 
!11 
" Case 2: The last inference of Il 1s an elimination. Repeat the main argument 
in the proof of the lemma to conclude that 3xAx ES$ and take 
a' 
n* -
0 
i;in 
Case 3: The last inference is an instance of the A-rule - trivial. 
* In any case, TI is a derivation for a I- An for some n, and cbviously 
satisfies the desired properties. 
1.3. Examples of 3-mute theories. 
++-1. 3. 1 Assume that for every 3xAx ES we have 
()( 
( * ) a I- -3xAx ==e,, a ~ An for some n. 
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Then a is trivially 3-mute. Theorem 1.2. was proved for this case, which is 
certainly the most useful, by Scarpellini [72]. 
Note, however, that in general we have here redundant information about a, 
,f. -I+ </> -I+ 
and thats~ is a smaller set than S. If lxAx ES , then An ES for every 
Cl Cl OI ct 
n and in any case, while An E s<I> only if there is a derivation IT for 
Ci, 
a \--:ix.Ax, and only for n=¢IT. After we know th. 1.2, (*) holds for every 
3-mute a, of course. 
1.3.2. The set of all classically-true flas is j-mute. The set of classicaJly 
provable flas is not. 
1.3.3. Every theory a s.t. s* is free of disjunction and~ is j-mute. E.g.-
a 
extend int. arith. with the scheme 
-H-
1. 3. 4. If every A Ea is classically true, and for every -:Ix.Ax ES and eve-
a 
ry n An is decidable, then a is 3--mute. For th"'n, if a 1-jxAx for jxAx E s* 
a 
then jx.Ax is true, hence for some n An is true. An is decidable, therefore 
J--Ari. 
This is in particular the case if for every 3xA Es* A is quantifier-
a 
free, e.g. - if a consists of almost-negative classically-true formulas. a 
may thus be taken to be the set of all instances of the (p.r.) Markov scheme 
,Vx.Ax ➔ -:Ix -, Ax (Aq_.f.). 
Also, a may contain true assertions of realizability, i.e. - flas of the 
form n r A where n classically-realizes A, because these flas are equiva-
..., 
lent in intuitionistic arithmetic to almost negative flas (vid. Troelstra 
[70] 3.7). 
1.3.5. Remark: Note that the condition A Ea ====- A classically true in 
example 1.3.4. may not be dropped. Take as an example a= {~G,M} 
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where 
( Godel Is fla) 
and Mis an instance of Markov scheme: 
Mis classically true, ~G is not, and both are allnost-negative. 
a is not :I-mute: 
a !-:Ix ·nProv(x, ,..G..,) 
hence, Prov(x,~G,) being p.r., 
If a is ~-mute, then 
But G is unprovable, so 
a r o=, 
or M r.,,G 
and hence, classically, r G,contradicting the famous underivability of G. 
2. A simple application of the method: 
Classical arithmetic is not an extension of bounded quantifier-complexity 
of intuitionistic arithmetic. 
As a corollary of the hierarchy theorem (see Rogers [67] §14.7.x), and 
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also as a particular case of Kreisel-Levy [68] th.4, we have 
2.1 Lemma: Given n, there is a close formula Fn which is undecidable from 
true formulas of qu.-complexity <n. 
2.2. Theorem (Smorynski [71]): Classical arith. (CA) is not an extension of 
bounded complexity of intuitionistic arith. (IA). 
Proof: Suppose Tis a set of true flas of qu.-complexity <n, 
s.t.(*) CA~IA + T. Let Fn be given by the lemma. By(*), there is a deriva-
tion 6 (in Gentzen's system of natural deduction for IA), which we may 
assume to be normal and without redundant parameters (in the sense of 
Prawitz [70]), for 
(1) If the last inference in 6 is an instance of the ,A-rule, then we get 
trivially- T I- F , contradicting the choice of F . 
n n 
(2) If the last inference is an introduction, then T decides F , contradic-
n 
tion again. 
(3) The last inference is not an instance of induction, because 6 2s normal, 
and F close. 
n 
(4) If the last inference is an elimination, let a be a main path in 6. a 
is then composed of elimination-steps only, and F v •F is a subformula 
n n 
of the top-formula A of cr. Necessarily then, the qu.-comp. of A~ n. 
A cannot be the conclusion of an instance of induction, because 6 is 
n.w.r.p. So A ET, contradicting the assumption that Tis of qu. com. <n. 
Thus we get a contradiction from(*). 
2.3. Remark: Smorynski has proved a more general result: he showed that 
CA _t rA + T 
for every consistent T of bounded complexity (not necessarily composed of 
-9-
true formulas only). 
3. Connection with Kleene's stroke-relation. 
3.1. Let A be a closed fla. By th. 1.2 {A} is 3-mute iff for every closed 
3xCx 
A ~ -3xCx ~ ;!.n A I- Cn . 
So, by Kleene [62] (2.2., 2.7., 2.11) {A} is ~-mute iff AJA. 
This may be proved directly, as a corollary of the following 
Proposition: Let¢ be a choice-functional for {A}, where A is a closed fla. 
For every B E s!, A I- B ====- AIB. 
Proof: By induction on the complexity of B. 
( 1) Bas is :The "smallest" flas in s! (i.e. - the flas F E s: s. t. no proper 
subformula of 1 is ins:) are, by the definition of s!, either (i) prime 
flas; or ( ij) existential flas 3xGx s. t. A H- :lxGx. 
In the first case the lemma holds trivially, and in the second - by the 
definition of I • 
(2) B & C E 
B, C E 
Af-B&C~ 
A ~ B , A r- C ~ ( ind. hyp. ) 
A I B , A I c ~ A I B &c • 
(3) E Sifl A (B➔C)E s! ,,:;;a;;;;t> C 
If A}- B ➔ C and A f- B then A ~- C; hence, by ind. hyp. A I C. So 
A f- B ====> A C i.e. -A I B ➔ C 
(Note that the condition A I Bin the definition of A I B ➔ C is not 
used here). 
( 4) :VxBx E S ! ==- V/n Bn E S ! . 
So, A f- YxBx = Vn A I- Bn 
(5) 3xBx e s! , 
So, by ind. 
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==e> v.n A I Bn (ind. hyp) 
~ A I VxBx . 
A I- :lxBx by a derivation II 
A r- B(~II) , B(~II) e s! . 
hyp. A I~ B(~II), and A I 3xBx. 
3.2. The equivalent 3,1 has the following peculiarity: while the definition 
of A I A involves all subformulas of A, the definition of "{A} is 3-mute" 
-++ involves only (part of) SA. The following proposition may throw some light on 
this. 
Proposition: If C -+ 3xBx I- 3xBx (where C -+ -3xBx is closed), then 
either ( i) C -+ -3-xBx i.... C ( and hence ~ 11C) ; 
or (ij) C-+ -3xBx I- Bn for some n. 
The proof is very similar to that of th. 2. 
4. Structural properties of -3-mute theories. 
4.o. If a is a finite set (of closed flas), then a is 3-mute iff (Aa) I (Aa), 
where (Aa) is the conjunction of all flas in a. So, the main interest in 
3-mute theories concerns those which are not finitely axiomatizable, and to 
which the method of Kleene's I does not apply. There is therefore some inte-
rest in considering the relation between a set of flas and its finite subsets, 
w.r.t. the notion of 3-muteness. 
4. 1. We have, first, the obvious "compactness" property: 
Proposition: If every finite a0ca is -3-mute, then a is -3-mute. We have, 
more generally: if for every finite a0ca there is an 3-mute a0 s.t. 
aos.aas.a, then a is i-mute. 
Proof: If a I- -3xCx (-3-xCx closed.) then for some finite a0 , a0 r 3xCx, hence 
a0 I- Cn and a t--Cn for some n. 
4.2. For essentially-existential (i.e. - not 3-mute) theories this compact-
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ness properly may fail. That is, 
Proposition: There is an ➔-mute theory a s.t. every finite a0ca is essen-
tially existential. 
Proof: .Arithmetic is essentially undecidable, so there is a sequence of true 
flas {A} <w s.t. A is not decided in CA by A A .• Let us write every A 
n n n 1 n 
in the {Y,&,AJ - fragment. i<n 
Define 
and for n > 1 
Classically (k=1 ,2, ... ) 
Bis 1-mute: Suppose that some Bis ➔-mute trivially, but no finite B0 c 
finite B0 = {B. }. c Bis ~-mute. Let m = i. J<n 
J 
max {i. }. 
j<n J 
We have then B0 lzA Am v ., Am, and B0 being 3-mute, B0 ~A Am. (,Am 1.s 
false). But then " A. tz?A A , contradicting 
i<m 1 m 
the construction of {A} 
n n<w 
4.3. Let us finally note that the "compactness" properly in 4.1 cannot be 
strengthen by fixing a certain bound on the size of the finite a0ca which 
have to be 3-mute. In other words: 
Proposition: For every natural number n, there is an essentially-existential 
set a s.t. every a0ca with less than n formulas in 3-mute. 
4.3.1. Lemma: There is a sequence 
A= {Ai}i<w of true flas, s.t. for non, 
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Proof: Let A0 be undecidable. Assume that {A.}. is defined, and let B be 1 i<n n 
some true {A.}. - undecidable fla. Define 
l 1<n 
A 
n 
A A. ➔ B 
i<n i n 
We show now that A ~ {An} ~A An. It is enough to see that if 
{A.}.<k ~{A} !-:±-CA A' 1 1- n n 
because then A 1s unprovable from any finite subset of A {A}. Suppose 
n n 
(*), and assume first that k > n, and that not(**), i.e. -
( ***) 
then 
{Ai}iQc t°A An 
i.tn 
~ - A A. -+ Bk' i<k l 
A ➔ Bk f- ~' and n 
{A.}. k 
' 
A -➔ Bk l l< n 
i.tn 
so, since k > n, 
from (***) 
f- A 
n 
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From classical propositional calculus then 
{A.}. kl,--A , 1 1< n 
i~n 
Contradicting(*), 
Assume now k < n, i.e. -
{A.}. k ~ A 1 1< n 
then {A.}.< ~A 1 J. n n 
J.. e. {A.}. ~ A 1 i<n i<n A. + B 1 n 
so {A.}. ~ B, contradicting the choice of B. 
1 i<n n n 
4.3.2, Proof of the proposition. 
Let A= {A.}. be as in lemma 4.3.1., let 
1 1<(,.) 
D. 
-
A. V '"'A. 
1 J. J. 
E. 
-
( A D.)&A. 
1 
"< J l J-n j~i 
and define a= {E.}. l J.<n (n+1 flas) 
a is obviously 3-mute. Let, on the other hand, 8 ca contain m flas, m .::_ n. 
Since the basic derivability properties of A, are invariant under permuta-
tions, we may assume, w.l.g., that 
Then, since E1 E 8 and n > 1 
8 ~ A v -.A 
n n 
If Sis 3-mute, then 
-14-
and 
contradicting the basic property of A. 
5. 3-stable theories. 
5.0 It was conjectured by liukasiewicz [52] that the "disjunction property" 
of a theory T 
~ A V B ==;:. ~ A or ~ B 
characterizes, among the propositional calculi, the intuitionistic prop. 
cal. from above; i.e.- no proper extension T of int. prop. cal. possess the 
"disjunction property". 
This conjecture was refuted by a counter-example (Kreisel-Putnam [57]), 
and then - by an infinity of (finitely axiomatizable) counter-examples 
(Gabbay-de Jongh [69]). 
Kleene [62] proved a stronger property of the int. prop. cal., namely -
C ~ A v B ===> C ~ A or C ~ B 
for exactly those C which are characterized by a given property (c\c). He 
subsequently conjectured that this property characterizes the int. prop. 
cal. from above, a conjecture which was proved by de Jongh [70]. 
An analogous property for intuitionistic arith. is: 
CL ~A 1m 
(3xAx closed) exactly when CL is 3-mute. 
But for IA this property is not a characterization from above among 
theories of arithmetic. I.e. - if we define 11 CL is 3-mute" with IA replaced 
throughout by T, then(*) holds for proper extensions T of IA. For instance, 
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let 8 be the set of instances of the scheme 
Vx-i-rJ;.x ➔ .,.,VxAx 
which is not provable in IA (vid. Kleene [52] p. 511, th. 63 (iv)). Then 
11 CL is 3-mute" with IA+13 replacing throughout IA in def. 1.1 means exactly 
"a u B is 3-mute" (relative to IA now), and (*) for IA+B follows. 
We focus now our attention on extensions of IA which satisfy(*). 
5.1. Definition: .An extension T of IA is 3-stable if whenever a is 3-mute 
relative to T (i.e. - when IA is everywhere replaced by Tin def. 1.1) then 
for every closed fla 3xCx. 
5.2. Existentially-valid inference rules. 
Definition: A rule of inference p -
{A.}. 
1 1 
B p 
is valid (modulo a and w.r.t. a theory T) if for each assignment* of numer-
als to parameters, 
We say that pis 3-valid if it is valid modulo a for every 3-mute set of 
flas a (and w.r.t. IA). 
5.3. Examples: (1) The uniform reflection principle 
IP[A] RP 
A 
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where 
JP[A] _Df :Ix Prov IA (x,'ft:.). 
For suppose that* is an assignment of numerals to para.meters, and 
that a. ~ :lx Prov ( x /A1) *, with a. 3-mute. Then 
(+) a. rProv(n,tj\1)* for some n. 
But Prov(n,'A')* is decidable in IA, so either 
(i ) I- Prov(n,'Ji!.)*, and then - since Prov(n,r.K)* = Prov(n;A*') - taking the 
derivation whose Godel-number is n - we get a derivation for 
and ipso facto, 
or ( ij) ~ lProv(n ;A')*, and then from ( +) a.~ 0 = 1 , and 
a 1--A • 
(2) Let F = {3xF.x}. be a set of closed flas s.t. for every (classically-) 
1 J. 
true (3xF) E F there is exactly one number nF s.t. FnF. 
For instance -
F0 = {3xT(e,e,x)}e is such a set. 
Let p be the rule of instantiation for F, i.e. -
( (JxFx)eF) 
where for false (~xFx) E F we define nF = O, say. 
Pis j-Valid trivially. The rule of instantiation for the F0 defined 
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above is of course not recursively definable. 
(3) We shall see in the sequel that Markov's scheme 
,VxPx -+ :Ix -. Px (P g_u.-free) 
is not :I-valid (though it is valid). 
5.4. We understand, from now on, that when pis asserted to be an :I-valid 
rule, then we are also given an assignment of derivations to derivations 
which attach to a derivation b. for a~ A a derivation t:.P for a f- B, whenever 
A 
BP with closed A,B and 3-mute a. 
When pis an inference-rule, we write IAPfor IA extended with the rule j· 
Theorem: If pis ~-valid, then IAP is 3-stable. 
Let us first stress some properties of derivations in IAP. 
5,4.1. Definition: Let p be valid modulo a. A p-a reduction is a transfor-
mation of derivations of the form 
a 
t:.. a i 
A. ~ t,. p (t,.P p-free) i 
B p B 
(provided all open assumption of the original derivation are in a, and A., 
i 
Bare closed). A derivation of IAP is <p,a>-normal if it cannot be reduced, 
either by a p-a reduction, or by one of the reductions defined by Prawitz 
[70]. If pis 3-valid, we say that a derivation is p-normal, if it is 
<p,a>-normal for every :I-mute a. Let p be now some 3-valid rule. 
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5.4.2. Lemma: Every derivation can be transformed by a finite number of re-
ductions into a p-normal derivation (without redundant parameters). 
5.4.3. Remark: The proof of the lemma is not an immediate corallary of the 
normalization theorem. If we normalize a derivation - except for p-reduc-
tions, and turn then to the p-reductions, then new logical detours may 
appear, even if 6P is always normal. 
If, conversely, we first do with all p-reductions, and turn then to 
usual reductions, then new possible p-reductions may be created. That is, 
we may have an instance of ➔-reductions of the form 
OJ 
[CJ 6 
I, [CJ 
A I1 
B p A 
B p I2 I ) I2 
6 D (➔-reduction) 
I) D 
C C ➔ D 
D IT 
IT 
The indicated instance of p may be irreducible in the original deriva-
tion, because the open assumptions of [CJ do not form an ~-mute set of flas, 
I, 
while it is reducible in the reduct shown on the right, because the open 
6 
assumptions of [CJ do form such a set. 
I, 
Also, new p-detours may arrise from V-reductions, e.g. -
VxA:x. 
Aa 
Ba p 
VxBx 
Bo 
-19-
('If-reduction) 
VxAx 
Ao 
Bo P 
If {VxAx} is j-mute then the indicated instance of pis irreducible in the 
original derivation, but reducible in the V-reduced one. 
5.4.4. Proof of the lemma 
We just have to modify slightly Prawitz [70] proof of the normalization 
theorem for arithmetic. All notions are relativized to the extended system. 
Thus, to the definition of strong validity we add the clause: 
a 
6 is p-strongly-valid if either 
A 
B p 
(i ) a lS not 3-mute anJ~is p-strongly-valid, 
or ( ij ) a lS 3-mute, and for every assignment* of numerals to parameters, 
* a 
(6*/ is (p-)strongly-valid. 
* A 
The modifications required in the proof of the normalization-theorem 
are straightforward, and we leave them out. 
5.4.5. Proof of the theorem. 
The proof is completely analogous to that of lemma 1.2.2. and theorem 
1.2. The only argument to be added is this: In the proof of lemma 1.2.2., 
. 1 b ,1 . 1 no instance of p may occur in the branch 0 in 6, ecause u is p-norma. 
The same argument is used for case 2 in the proof of th. 1.2. 
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5.4.6. Remark: Theorem 5.4. was proved, for the uniform reflection princi-
ple, by Scarpellini [72]. 
5.5. Corollary: Markov's scheme 
-rV.xPx ) 
3x-rPx (M 
is not 3-valid. 
Proof: Take a= {,G} where 
G - Vx-,Prov(xtG'). 
(P qu.-free) 
a is j-mute relative to any theory, because no~ occur in a. 
( ) • 7 • • 4 IA(M) . 3 1 If M is ~-valid, then - using th. 5 •. - is -stab e, 
can conclude, like in 1. 3, 5, that 'fcA G, which is not the case. 
and we 
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